MAK Capital pushes board changes and biologics spin-off at Evotec (EVO)
Key Summary: On March 30, 2026, MAK Capital One (7%) spoke with Chair Prof. Dr. Iris Low-Friedrich, proposing governance changes, including nominating Dr. Wolfgang Hofmann and pursuing an IPO and spin-off of Just-Evotec Biologics US.
Market Cap: 845 million | Evotec SE operates as a drug discovery and development company in the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and internationally.
On March 30, 2026, MAK Capital One (7%) held a call with Supervisory Board Chair Prof. Dr. Iris Low-Friedrich, outlining proposals to improve Evotec’s strategy and governance, including nominating Dr. Wolfgang Hofmann to the board and pursuing an IPO and spin-off of Just-Evotec Biologics US. Source
JANA secures board seat and approval to raise stake to 19.9% at Rapid7, Inc (RPD)
Key Summary: On September 27, 2024, JANA Partners and Cannae Holdings disclosed a 6.4% stake and reported discussions with the Board and management about operational issues, governance, and a potential company sale. On March 11, 2025, JANA (5.8%) signed Nominee Agreements with Michael Joseph Burns and Chad Kinzelberg, who agreed to join JANA's slate of nominees for election as directors at the 2025 Annual Meeting. On March 21, 2025, JANA entered into a cooperation agreement with the company. On March 26, 2026, JANA Partners reached an agreement for Kevin Galligan’s board nomination, with support for his election and approval to increase its stake up to 19.9%.
Market Cap: $359 million| Rapid7, Inc. provides cybersecurity solutions under the Rapid7, Nexpose, and Metasploit brand names.
· On September 27, 2024, JANA Partners and Cannae Holdings disclosed 6.4% and stated that they had engaged in constructive discussions with the Board and management regarding operational challenges, management and compensation issues, corporate governance, evaluating the potential sale of the company. Source
· On March 11, 2025, JANA (5.8%) entered into Nominee Agreements with each of Michael Joseph Burns and Chad Kinzelberg pursuant to which each Nominee has agreed, upon the election of JANA, to become members of a slate of nominees and to stand for election as directors of the company at the 2025 Annual Meeting. Source
· On March 21, 2025, JANA entered into a cooperation agreement with the company pursuant to which Kevin Galligan, a Partner and Director of Research at JANA, Michael Burns and Wael Mohamed will be appointed to the Board.
· On April 20, 2025, under the Cooperation Agreement, JANA notified the company to appoint Kevin Galligan to the Board effective April 22, 2025. Source
· On March 26, 2026, JANA Partners entered into a Nomination and Support Agreement under which the company will nominate Kevin Galligan for its 2026 annual meeting and support his election, while permitting JANA Partners to acquire up to 19.9% ownership, with Board approval under Delaware law. Source
Impactive Capital Nominates Four Candidates to WEX (WEX) Board
Key Summary: Between March and October 2025, Impactive Capital (6.7–7%) repeatedly criticized WEX’s weak performance, poor governance, and refusal to add shareholder representation. After voting against directors Melissa Smith, Jack VanWoerkom, and James Neary—who received historically low support—Impactive warned of a crisis in investor confidence and announced plans to nominate its own director slate, including Alemany, Cornick, Fox, Saxena, and Taylor Wolfe, for the 2026 annual meeting. On February 9, 2026, Impactive Capital (~5% holder) nominated four directors to the WEX Inc. board
Market Cap: $5.6 billion | WEX Inc. operates a commerce platform in the United States and internationally.
· On March 6, 2025, Impactive Capital (6.7%) stated that it has initiated discussions with the board and management concerning the company's operational and share price performance, along with specific corporate governance issues such as appointing a shareholder representative to the Board. Source
· On May 2, 2025, Impactive Capital announced it will vote against three directors—Jack VanWoerkom, Melissa Smith, and James Neary—at the 2025 annual meeting, citing long-term underperformance, lack of accountability, and the Board’s refusal to add shareholder representation. Impactive criticized WEX’s strategic oversight and widening gap in performance compared to peer Corpay, despite having similar starting points. Source
· On May 22, 2025, Impactive Capital (7%) criticized the board following the 2025 annual meeting, where directors Jack VanWoerkom, Melissa Smith (CEO/Chair), and James Neary received historically low support, signaling a crisis of investor confidence. Impactive attributed this to WEX’s persistent underperformance and lack of meaningful engagement, despite its four-year effort to work constructively with the board. Unless WEX significantly improves performance or shareholder alignment, Impactive plans to nominate at least four directors for election at the 2026 annual meeting. Source
· On October 20, 2025, Impactive Capital criticized the company’s persistent underperformance and lack of urgency for change despite its prior engagement with the Board. After voting against three directors at the 2025 annual meeting—each receiving sharply reduced support—Impactive announced plans to nominate its own slate of directors, including Alemany, Cornick, Fox, Saxena, and Taylor Wolfe, for the 2026 meeting. Source
· On February 9, 2026, Impactive Capital (~5% holder) nominated four directors to the WEX Inc. board, citing entrenched governance, poor capital allocation, and severe underperformance versus peer Corpay, Inc. and the S&P MidCap 400. Impactive highlighted years of failed engagement, widening margin and valuation gaps, and a 2025 shareholder rebuke of incumbent directors, arguing its nominees—who have personally bought more WEX shares than the entire board over nine years—bring needed payments, financial, and governance expertise to restore accountability and improve performance. Source
· On March 30, 2026, Impactive Capital (~4.9% stake) filed proxy materials criticizing governance, capital allocation, and operational missteps, and is seeking to elect three director nominees at the 2026 annual meeting to reconstitute the board and improve oversight and shareholder value. Source
Beretta Holding Nominated Four Directors to Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. (RGR)
Key Summary: Beretta Holding S.A. escalated its campaign at Sturm, Ruger & Company by nominating four directors, citing margin decline, poor capital allocation, weak governance, and persistent underperformance, while denying any intent to gain control and pushing for a governance reset. It later proposed a tender offer for up to 20.05% at $44.80 (~20% premium) and urged removal of the poison pill to raise ownership to 30%, accusing the board of entrenchment and blocking shareholder value.
Market Cap: $694 million | Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, designs, manufactures, and sells firearms under the Ruger name and trademark in the United States.
· On February 24, 2026, Beretta Holding (9.95%) nominated four director candidates—William Detwiler, Mark DeYoung, Fredrick DiSanto, and Michael Christodolou—for election at the 2026 annual meeting. Beretta cited sustained shareholder value destruction driven by margin compression, poor capital allocation, weak governance, and misaligned incentives, highlighting minimal insider ownership, net insider selling, and severe underperformance versus peers and benchmarks. It argued the current board lacks relevant expertise and accountability, and that meaningful board change is necessary to restore oversight, improve performance, and maximize long-term shareholder value. Source
· On March 5, 2026, Beretta Holding criticized the company’s weak Q4 and FY2025 results, citing declining margins, falling earnings, and ineffective strategy under current leadership. Beretta reiterated its push for board change at the 2026 annual meeting, promoting its four director nominees and arguing a governance reset is needed to restore profitability and accountability. Source
· On March 10, 2026, Beretta Holding denied seeking control, stating it proposed only a strategic minority investment and limited board representation to improve performance. Beretta criticized Ruger’s board for resisting engagement, maintaining entrenched leadership despite underperformance, breaching confidentiality, and said it remains open to a negotiated solution. Source
· On March 19, 2026, Beretta Holding sent a letter to stockholders stating that the company has suffered from years of underperformance, weak execution, and poor board oversight, and urged shareholders to elect its four nominees to improve accountability and restore shareholder value. It urged investors to elect its four independent nominees to improve oversight and restore value.
· On March 25, 2026, Beretta Holding sent a letter to the Board stating that it aims to support performance as a strategic partner, not gain control. After failed talks with the board, it nominated a minority slate and plans a tender offer to buy up to 20.05% at $44.80 (~20% premium), subject to approvals. It urges removal of the poison pill to allow up to 30% ownership, arguing this would not imply control, while accusing the board of entrenchment and blocking shareholder value.
· On March 28, 2026, the company rejected Beretta Holding’s request for a waiver under its poison pill, which was necessary to proceed with an all-cash tender offer to acquire up to 20.05% of shares at $44.80 per share—a ~20% premium to the 60-day VWAP—and instead proposed an in-person meeting. On March 31, 2026, Beretta Holding’s counsel (Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP) responded, expressing strong dissatisfaction with the Board’s decision, criticizing it for blocking a premium offer to shareholders, questioning the Board’s willingness to engage, and stating that all litigation options are being evaluated. An in-person meeting between the parties has been scheduled for April 9, 2026. Source
Joseph Stilwell signals intent to collaborate with URSB Bancorp, Inc. (URSB) to drive shareholder value
Key Summary: On March 31, 2026, Joseph Stilwell (9.6%) stated that he hopes to work with management and the board to maximize shareholder value
Market Cap: NA | URSB Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”), the stock holding company of United Roosevelt Savings Bank (the “Bank”)
On March 31, 2026, Joseph Stilwell (9.6%) stated that he hopes to work with management and the board to maximize shareholder value. Source
James C. Mastandrea nominated director candidates to the Board of Whitestone REIT (WSR)
Key Summary: James C. Mastandrea, a major Whitestone REIT shareholder, launched a proxy fight in January 2026 to replace the entire board, citing prolonged underperformance, NAV discount, weak growth, poor capital allocation, dilution, high costs, and governance failures, and in March 2026 formally nominated six independent candidates, criticizing the board for ignoring credible acquisition offers and arguing that a reconstituted board with real estate and capital markets expertise can restore discipline and unlock value through improved operations or potential asset sales. Erez Asset Management launched an activist campaign against Whitestone REIT in March 2024, nominating two board candidates and criticizing underperformance, rejected buyout offers, poor capital allocation, high costs, debt, and weak governance; it filed multiple proxy materials, issued an investor presentation, and gained ISS support for its nominees while urging votes against certain incumbents, but despite its efforts and continued push for change, all of Whitestone’s nominees were ultimately re-elected at the May 2024 AGM. KBS Strategic Opportunity REIT built a 7.1% stake in Whitestone in 2017 (later 9.36%) and pushed for governance and compensation changes, including nominating trustees and proposing Board declassification; despite filing proxy materials and receiving ISS support, its nominees were not elected at the May 2018 AGM, though the declassification proposal passed, and KBS later reduced its stake to 4.99% by year-end 2018.
Market Cap: $861 million | Whitestone REIT is a community-centered real estate investment trust (REIT) that acquires, owns, operates, and develops open-air, retail centers located in some of the fastest growing markets in the country: Phoenix, Austin, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston and San Antonio.
James C. Mastandrea
On January 2, 2026, James C. Mastandrea, a long-time shareholder of Whitestone REIT, announced plans to file a preliminary proxy and nominate a full slate of six independent trustees at the 2026 annual meeting to replace the current board, citing years of share-price underperformance, persistent discounts to NAV, weak external growth, poor capital allocation, and excessive executive compensation. Mastandrea criticized the board for strategic missteps, dilution from equity issuance below NAV, shrinking portfolio size, elevated costs, litigation spending, and weak governance, arguing these failures have eroded shareholder value despite favorable Sun Belt market dynamics. He believes a reconstituted board with deep real estate and capital-markets expertise can reset strategy, restore accountability, improve operations and capital discipline, and ultimately unlock value through improved performance or a strategic sale or liquidation of assets. Source
On March 17, 2026, James C. Mastandrea nominated a slate of six independent candidates for the 2026 Annual Meeting, arguing that prolonged share price underperformance, a valuation discount, and weak Board oversight have hindered the Company despite valuable assets. He criticized the Board for ignoring credible acquisition offers and believes new directors with real estate and capital markets expertise can unlock shareholder value, potentially through asset sales, and is urging shareholders to vote in favor of his nominees using the GOLD proxy card. Source
On March 31, 2026, James C. Mastandrea urges shareholders to support his slate via the GOLD proxy card, emphasizing the need for accountability and improved governance to realize the Company’s full potential. Source
Erez Asset Management
On March 7, 2024, Erez Asset Management stated its plans to nominate two candidates for the Board at the 2024 annual meeting. They highlighted Whitestone's underperformance and urged shareholders to question management during a conference call, focusing on issues like rejecting a premium buyout offer, value-destructive asset sales, high public company costs, excessive debt levels, and the board's lack of relevant experience. Source
On March 19, 2024, Erez Asset Management nominated two candidates for election to the Board at the 2024 AGM.
On April 2, 2024, Erez Asset Management filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.
On April 9, 2024, Erez Asset Management filed proxy materials urging shareholders to vote for their nominees and withhold votes from current trustees Taylor and Berry.
On April 22, 2024, Erez Asset Management issued the Investor Presentation titled “Change is Needed at Whitestone: Erez Offers a Path to Restoring Value for Shareholders.”
On April 26, 2024, Erez Asset Management filed proxy materials urging shareholders to vote for their nominees. It sent a letter to the shareholders highlighting the company's underperformance compared to peers, inefficient operations, and questionable governance practices.
On April 30, 2024, ISS supports Erez's nominees, Bruce Schanzer and Catherine Clark, for the board of directors, while advising shareholders to withhold support from Whitestone's nominees, David Taylor and Nandita Berry. Source
On May 6, 2024, Erez Asset Management reiterated the need for change at Whitestone REIT and rebutted accusations made by Whitestone regarding a potential acquisition offer. Erez clarified it wasn't pursuing an acquisition and criticized Whitestone's misleading allegations. Source
On May 14, 2024, the company announced that based on the preliminary vote count at the Company’s 2024 AGM, all six Whitestone’s nominees have been re-elected to the Board. Source
KBS Strategic Opportunity REIT
In mid-2017, KBS Strategic Opportunity REIT disclosed a 7.1% stake and aimed to align management and shareholder interests by discussing changes to compensation. By December 2017, their stake rose to 9.36%, prompting a notice to nominate trustees and propose declassifying the Board. They filed proxy materials in March and April 2018, urging support for their nominees and proposals. Despite ISS's recommendation, their candidates weren't elected at the May 2018 AGM, but the proposal to declassify the Board passed. By December 2018, KBS reduced its stake to 4.99%.
Goldenwise Capital highlights undervaluation and signals engagement with potential board representation at Phunware, Inc. (PHUN)
Key Summary: On March 20, 2026, Goldenwise Capital Group Ltd (5.5%) stated the company is undervalued and plans to engage with management and the board on strategy, capital allocation, governance, and operations, while indicating potential pursuit of board representation.
M.Cap: $36 million | Phunware, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides integrated software platform that equips companies with the products, solutions, and services to engage, manage, and monetize their mobile application portfolios in the United States and internationally.
· On March 20, 2026, Goldenwise Capital Group Ltd (5.5%) stated that the company is undervalued relative to its intrinsic value, including balance sheet strength and strategic opportunities, and intends to engage with management and the board on capital allocation, strategy, governance, and operational improvements to enhance shareholder value. They stated that they may seek board representation to support this engagement. Source
· On March 31, 2026, Goldenwise Capital Group Ltd increased its stake to 6.1% and reiterated its concerns. Source
ATG Fund nominated nine candidates to the Board of Empery Digital (EMPD)
Key Summary: On February 26, 2026, ATG Fund (13.7%) submitted a nomination notice proposing a slate of nine director candidates for election to the board at the 2026 annual meeting. On February 23, 2026, 9.8% shareholder Tice Brown rejected management’s offer to buy his stake at 100% of mNAV for a standstill, calling it inconsistent and self-serving. He accused management of entrenchment and urged CEO removal, board replacement, and liquidation of Bitcoin with proceeds returned to shareholders. On February 26, 2026, Tice Brown, owner of ~10.3% of Empery Digital, nominated himself to the Board
Market Cap: $129 million | Empery Digital Inc. designs, develops, and sells electric off road powersport vehicles in the United States.
ATG Fund
· On February 26, 2026, ATG Fund (13.7%) submitted a nomination notice proposing a slate of nine director candidates for election to the board at the 2026 annual meeting. Source
· On March 23, 2026, ATG Fund filed proxy materials seeking to replace the entire board by nominating nine directors for election at the 2026 annual meeting, arguing that a reconstituted board with independent, experienced members is urgently needed to better represent shareholder interests and enhance value. Source
· On April 1, 2026, ATG Fund filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.
Tice Brown
· On February 23, 2026, Tice Brown, a 9.8% shareholder of Empery Digital, revealed that management offered to repurchase his entire stake at 100% of mNAV in exchange for a standstill, which he rejected. He criticized the proposal as inconsistent with the company’s buyback rationale and accused management of entrenchment and misusing shareholder capital, especially as other investors sell at steep discounts. Brown called for the immediate removal of CEO Ryan Lane, replacement of the Board, and liquidation of Bitcoin holdings with proceeds returned to shareholders. Source
· On February 26, 2026, Tice Brown, owner of ~10.3% of Empery Digital, nominated himself to the Board, citing governance failures and a large discount to liquidation value. He called for board replacement, CEO resignation, and significant capital returns, criticized bitcoin holdings and anti-takeover measures, and stated he aims to strengthen shareholder rights and maximize value. Source
Summer Road Pushes Board Change at Ingles Markets (IMKTA) with Independent Nominee
Key Summary: Summer Road LLC is seeking to elect nominee Rory A. Held to Ingles Markets’ Board at the 2026 meeting, citing weak governance and limited independence due to family control, and urging shareholders to vote via the GOLD proxy card.
M. Cap: $1.6 billion| Ingles Markets, Incorporated (Ingles) is a supermarket chain in the southeast United States.
Summer Road LLC
· On March 17, 2026, Summer Road LLC, a shareholder of Ingles Markets, Incorporated, launched a campaign to elect its nominee Rory A. Held to the Board at the 2026 annual meeting, citing weak governance, lack of independence, and poor shareholder engagement driven by the Ingles family’s control; it argues that adding an independent director with strong financial and capital markets expertise would strengthen oversight and unlock shareholder value, and is urging Class A shareholders to vote on its GOLD proxy card in support of its nominee. Source
· On April 1, 2026, Summer Road criticizes governance, noting that despite owning ~77% of economic interest, control remains with Chairman Robert P. Ingle II due to the dual-class structure, resulting in weak oversight, poor capital allocation, and underperformance. After failed engagement, it has nominated Rory A. Held as an independent director, arguing he would better represent shareholders versus board-backed nominees, while pushing for reforms including improved capital allocation, potential OpCo/PropCo separation, stronger investor communication, and better pay-performance alignment. Source
GAMCO
GAMCO, initially holding a 16.89% stake, launched an activist campaign in 2017 to nominate directors and filed proxy materials for the 2018 AGM, but reached a settlement in March 2018 with the company agreeing to nominate one of its candidates, leading GAMCO to withdraw its slate; it later gradually reduced its stake to 13.97% in 2020 and 12.96% in 2021.
Irenic Sends Letter to Snap Inc. (SNAP) Outlining Actionable Steps to Unlock Value
Key Summary: On April 1, 2026, Irenic Capital (~2.5% holder) said Snap is deeply undervalued (~$7.2B vs ~$35B potential) due to poor execution, weak financials, and governance issues, and called for shutting or spinning off Spectacles, cutting costs, revamping compensation, focusing on AI-driven ad monetization, leveraging data, initiating buybacks, and improving voting rights—arguing Snap must shift to disciplined, profit-focused execution to unlock value.
M. Cap: $8.3 billion| Snap Inc. operates as a technology company in North America, Europe, and internationally.
On April 1, 2026, Irenic Capital, a ~2.5% shareholder in Snap, argues the company is significantly undervalued (~$7.2B EV vs potential ~$35B) despite strong assets (large user base, AR/AI capabilities), due to poor execution, weak financial performance, and governance issues . It urges major changes: shut or spin off loss-making Spectacles, cut costs and headcount, redesign stock-based compensation, prioritize AI-driven ad monetization, better leverage data for AI opportunities, initiate share buybacks, and improve governance by granting voting rights to Class A shareholders. Overall, Irenic believes Snap must shift from product innovation to disciplined, profit-focused execution to unlock value. Source