Key Summary: From November 2025 to March 2026, YZi Labs launched an activist campaign against CEA Industries Inc., filing consent solicitations to expand the board and elect new directors while accusing 10X Capital and director Hans Thomas of mismanagement, transparency failures, and regulatory non-compliance. The company responded by adopting a poison pill and stricter bylaws, which YZi criticized as entrenchment measures while continuing to solicit shareholder consents and push for governance changes. On March 13, 2026, YZi requested the company set a record date to allow shareholders to provide written consent for its proposals.

Market Cap: $144 million | CEA Industries Inc., through its subsidiary, Surna Cultivation Technologies LLC, focuses on the sale of environmental control and other technologies and services to the controlled environment agriculture (CEA) industry in the United States and Canada.

·         On November 27, 2025, YZi Labs Management filed a preliminary consent statement seeking written consents to expand the board and elect new directors, arguing that stronger oversight is needed after what it sees as weak execution, poor communication, SEC filing delays, and stock underperformance despite a $500 million PIPE and appreciation in BNB, the company’s primary treasury asset. Source

·         On December 3, 2025, YZi Labs Management filed a preliminary consent solicitation accused 10X Capital of mismanagement, transparency failures, and abandoning BNC’s promised BNB Treasury Strategy, contributing to severe shareholder value destruction. It demanded corrective action and solicited consents to expand the board with independent directors. Source

·         On December 19, 2025, YZi Labs and seven nominees formed a group (4.9%) to jointly file Schedule 13D disclosures, pursue board representation, and solicit consents to expand the board and elect the nominees, with YZi Labs controlling nominee trading and covering related expenses, and plans to file a revised preliminary Schedule 14A to seek these consents. Source

·         On December 29, 2025, the company adopted a poison pill and stricter bylaws requiring extensive disclosures and forms for nominating directors or soliciting consents. That same day, YZi Labs requested the required documents to continue its effort to expand the Board and appoint its nominees, and Ms. Zhang requested the relevant director guidelines. Source

·         On January 5, 2026, YZi Labs Management Ltd. issued a press release sharply criticizing CEA Industries Inc. for adopting a poison pill and defensive bylaw amendments, arguing the moves are stockholder-unfriendly, legally excessive, and aimed at board entrenchment rather than shareholder interests. YZi accused the Board of delaying the 2025 annual meeting, undermining a free and fair director election process, and misrepresenting past consideration of alternative crypto tokens, citing public comments by the CEO and conflicts involving board members, while reaffirming its intent to give shareholders the opportunity to elect new directors at the 2025 annual meeting.

·         On February 4, 2026, YZi Labs denied a claim that it’s Strategic Services Agreement was secret, stating it was fully disclosed and terminated in December 2025 after efforts to reduce fees. YZi Labs also rejected allegations that it blocked amendments to 10X Capital’s asset management agreement and reaffirmed its commitment to transparency and shareholder value. Source

·         On February 6, 2026, YZi Labs asked the Board to clarify how amended bylaws affect shareholders’ written consent rights, warning that new requirements limiting consent execution to record holders could hinder participation by beneficial owners. YZi Labs, which is seeking to expand the Board and elect new directors, requested the Company waive certain requirements or accept consents submitted through standard brokerage channels. Source

·         On February 18, 2026, YZi Labs issued a press release accusing 10X Capital and director Hans Thomas of failing to disclose beneficial ownership in CEA Industries, alleging breaches of Sections 13(d) and 16(a), and calling for immediate disclosure. The firm claims 10X has exceeded the 5% threshold since late 2025 without filing a Schedule 13D and that Thomas has not filed a Form 3 despite being a director. YZi Labs emphasized its own compliance and is simultaneously pursuing a consent solicitation to expand the Board and elect new directors.

·         On March 10, 2026, YZi Labs Management, a significant shareholder of CEA Industries (BNC), criticized 10X Capital CEO and director Hans Thomas for filing overdue Section 16 ownership disclosures months late, calling the filings evidence of weak internal controls and compliance failures. Source

·         On March 13, 2026, YZi Labs requested the company to set a record date allowing stockholders to provide written consent for proposals in its preliminary consent statement filed with the SEC. The request complies with bylaws amended in December 2025 that imposed stricter requirements and procedural hurdles for director nominations and consent solicitations. Source

Key Summary: Between January and March 2026, Endeavor Investor Group escalated its activist campaign against Mawson Infrastructure Group Inc., calling for leadership changes, improved governance, and a clearer AI/HPC strategy while criticizing dilution and the adoption of a poison pill. The dispute intensified after Mawson sued Endeavor over alleged securities law violations, and on March 16, 2026, Endeavor launched a consent solicitation to remove the entire board, arguing governance failures and poor capital allocation led to a roughly 95% drop in the company’s market value since 2021.

M.Cap: $2.9 million | Mawson Infrastructure Group Inc. develops and operates digital infrastructure for digital currency on the bitcoin blockchain network in the United States.

·         On January 22, 2026, the Endeavor Investor Group escalated its campaign at Mawson Infrastructure, issuing an open letter arguing the company’s HPC and digital infrastructure assets are deeply undervalued due to governance failures, poor capital allocation, leadership instability, and a strained balance sheet, and calling for leadership change, a sharper AI/HPC strategy, an equity recapitalization, and improved governance. The same day, Endeavor said it plans to file a preliminary proxy and solicit votes via a WHITE universal proxy card to elect director nominees at the 2026 annual meeting, while rejecting Mawson’s lawsuit as a mischaracterization of its actions and reaffirming its willingness to engage constructively as a long-term shareholder. Source

·         On January 29, 2026, the company filed an amended complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware alleging that the Endeavor Investor Group violated Sections 13(d), 14(a), and 10(b) of the Exchange Act through alleged disclosure failures, misleading statements, and trading-related omissions, and is seeking injunctive relief, trading restrictions, and damages. Source

·         On February 4, 2026, The Endeavor Investor Group criticized Mawson Infrastructure Group’s adoption of a stockholder rights plan, stating it entrenches management, restricts shareholder influence, and follows significant share dilution, while urging improved governance, capital discipline, and a credible strategy to enhance shareholder value. Source

·         On March 16, 2026, Endeavor Investor Group announced a consent solicitation to remove the entire board of Mawson Infrastructure Group Inc., citing governance failures, poor capital allocation, and strategic missteps that it says destroyed shareholder value, with market capitalization falling from about $450 million in 2021 to roughly $15 million in early 2026. Endeavor argues Mawson’s infrastructure assets still hold value for high-performance computing and AI applications and said it is prepared to support a refreshed board and invest capital to stabilize the company and restore shareholder confidence. Source

James C. Mastandrea nominated director candidates to the Board of Whitestone REIT (WSR)

Key Summary: James C. Mastandrea, a major Whitestone REIT shareholder, launched a proxy fight in January 2026 to replace the entire board, citing prolonged underperformance, NAV discount, weak growth, poor capital allocation, dilution, high costs, and governance failures, and in March 2026 formally nominated six independent candidates, criticizing the board for ignoring credible acquisition offers and arguing that a reconstituted board with real estate and capital markets expertise can restore discipline and unlock value through improved operations or potential asset sales. Erez Asset Management launched an activist campaign against Whitestone REIT in March 2024, nominating two board candidates and criticizing underperformance, rejected buyout offers, poor capital allocation, high costs, debt, and weak governance; it filed multiple proxy materials, issued an investor presentation, and gained ISS support for its nominees while urging votes against certain incumbents, but despite its efforts and continued push for change, all of Whitestone’s nominees were ultimately re-elected at the May 2024 AGM. KBS Strategic Opportunity REIT built a 7.1% stake in Whitestone in 2017 (later 9.36%) and pushed for governance and compensation changes, including nominating trustees and proposing Board declassification; despite filing proxy materials and receiving ISS support, its nominees were not elected at the May 2018 AGM, though the declassification proposal passed, and KBS later reduced its stake to 4.99% by year-end 2018.

Market Cap: $861 million | Whitestone REIT is a community-centered real estate investment trust (REIT) that acquires, owns, operates, and develops open-air, retail centers located in some of the fastest growing markets in the country: Phoenix, Austin, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston and San Antonio.

James C. Mastandrea

·         On January 2, 2026, James C. Mastandrea, a long-time shareholder of Whitestone REIT, announced plans to file a preliminary proxy and nominate a full slate of six independent trustees at the 2026 annual meeting to replace the current board, citing years of share-price underperformance, persistent discounts to NAV, weak external growth, poor capital allocation, and excessive executive compensation. Mastandrea criticized the board for strategic missteps, dilution from equity issuance below NAV, shrinking portfolio size, elevated costs, litigation spending, and weak governance, arguing these failures have eroded shareholder value despite favorable Sun Belt market dynamics. He believes a reconstituted board with deep real estate and capital-markets expertise can reset strategy, restore accountability, improve operations and capital discipline, and ultimately unlock value through improved performance or a strategic sale or liquidation of assets. Source

·         On March 17, 2026, James C. Mastandrea nominated a slate of six independent candidates for the 2026 Annual Meeting, arguing that prolonged share price underperformance, a valuation discount, and weak Board oversight have hindered the Company despite valuable assets. He criticized the Board for ignoring credible acquisition offers and believes new directors with real estate and capital markets expertise can unlock shareholder value, potentially through asset sales, and is urging shareholders to vote in favor of his nominees using the GOLD proxy card. Source

Erez Asset Management

·         On March 7, 2024, Erez Asset Management stated its plans to nominate two candidates for the Board at the 2024 annual meeting. They highlighted Whitestone's underperformance and urged shareholders to question management during a conference call, focusing on issues like rejecting a premium buyout offer, value-destructive asset sales, high public company costs, excessive debt levels, and the board's lack of relevant experience. Source

·         On March 19, 2024, Erez Asset Management nominated two candidates for election to the Board at the 2024 AGM.

·         On April 2, 2024, Erez Asset Management filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees.

·         On April 9, 2024, Erez Asset Management filed proxy materials urging shareholders to vote for their nominees and withhold votes from current trustees Taylor and Berry.

·         On April 22, 2024, Erez Asset Management issued the Investor Presentation titled “Change is Needed at Whitestone: Erez Offers a Path to Restoring Value for Shareholders.”

·         On April 26, 2024, Erez Asset Management filed proxy materials urging shareholders to vote for their nominees. It sent a letter to the shareholders highlighting the company's underperformance compared to peers, inefficient operations, and questionable governance practices.

·         On April 30, 2024, ISS supports Erez's nominees, Bruce Schanzer and Catherine Clark, for the board of directors, while advising shareholders to withhold support from Whitestone's nominees, David Taylor and Nandita Berry. Source

·         On May 6, 2024, Erez Asset Management reiterated the need for change at Whitestone REIT and rebutted accusations made by Whitestone regarding a potential acquisition offer. Erez clarified it wasn't pursuing an acquisition and criticized Whitestone's misleading allegations. Source

·         On May 14, 2024, the company announced that based on the preliminary vote count at the Company’s 2024 AGM, all six Whitestone’s nominees have been re-elected to the Board. Source

KBS Strategic Opportunity REIT

In mid-2017, KBS Strategic Opportunity REIT disclosed a 7.1% stake and aimed to align management and shareholder interests by discussing changes to compensation. By December 2017, their stake rose to 9.36%, prompting a notice to nominate trustees and propose declassifying the Board. They filed proxy materials in March and April 2018, urging support for their nominees and proposals. Despite ISS's recommendation, their candidates weren't elected at the May 2018 AGM, but the proposal to declassify the Board passed. By December 2018, KBS reduced its stake to 4.99%.

Altai Capital nominated Board candidates to OraSure Technologies (OSUR)

Key Summary: On September 9, 2025, Altai Capital Management (5.13%) said it may engage with management, the board, shareholders, and other stakeholders on strategy, governance, capital structure, and board composition to enhance shareholder value. On December 17, 2025, Altai Capital Management announced its intent to nominate Rishi Bajaj and Digital Diagnostics CEO John Bertrand to the board at the 2026 AGM

Market Cap: $245 million | OraSure Technologies, Inc develops, manufactures, markets, sells, and distributes diagnostic products, specimen collection devices, and other diagnostic products in the United States, Europe, Africa, and internationally. 

·         On September 9, 2025, Altai Capital Management (5.13%) stated that it has engaged, and may continue to engage, with the management, board, shareholders, and other stakeholders on matters such as strategy, governance, capital structure, and board composition, with the goal of enhancing shareholder value. Source

·         On December 17, 2025, Altai Capital Management announced its intent to nominate Rishi Bajaj and Digital Diagnostics CEO John Bertrand to the board at the 2026 AGM, citing deep dissatisfaction with the board’s strategy, capital allocation, and governance. Altai argues OraSure squandered its Covid windfall, made poor venture-style investments, continues to burn cash, and has massively underperformed peers, while recent board refreshment efforts are merely cosmetic. Source

·         On January 15, 2026, Altai Capital Management nominated Mr. Bajaj and John Bertrand for election to the Board and submitted a proposal to declassify the Board so that all directors stand for annual election at the 2026 Annual Meeting, and stated that it plans to solicit proxies to elect its nominees and approve the declassification proposal. Source

·         On March 17, 2026, Altai Capital Management urged Board changes and a settlement to appoint its nominees Rishi Bajaj and John Bertrand, citing chronic share price underperformance, poor capital allocation, weak governance, low director ownership, and misaligned executive compensation. Altai also called for a strategic review including a potential sale of the company, arguing its nominees bring relevant turnaround and industry expertise to restore value. Source 

Braemar Hotels & Resorts Inc (BHR) Sues Bob Ghassemieh Over Alleged Cooperation Agreement Breach and Disclosure Violations

Key Summary: In March–June 2024, Blackwells Capital launched an activist campaign at Braemar Hotels & Resorts seeking board changes, governance reforms, and termination of the Ashford management agreement, including nominating four directors, filing lawsuits, and soliciting shareholder support.The campaign ended with a July 2, 2024 cooperation agreement, but major shareholder Wafic Rida Saïd (≈9.8%) continued pressing governance concerns through letters and emails and warned in March 2026 of potential legal action over insider arrangements and excessive fees. In June 2025, Bob Ghassemieh and other shareholders nominated three directors and accused the board of manipulating the AGM timeline, but in August 2025 he reached a cooperation agreement and joined the board. In February 2026, the company accused him of breaching the agreement and accepted his resignation, which he disputed as baseless and retaliatory.

Market Cap: $232 million | Braemar Hotels & Resorts Inc. is a real estate investment trust (REIT) focused on investing in luxury hotels and resorts.

Bob Ghassemieh

·         On June 2, 2025, Mr. Bob Ghassemieh (together with other angry shareholders) nominated himself, Fred Ghassemieh and Samuel Jagger for election at the 2025 AGM. They also accused the board of manipulating the AGM timeline to obstruct nominations. They intend to continue engaging with management, the Board, stockholders, and others regarding their investment, Board representation, Board composition, and other strategic initiatives.

·         On August 25, 2025, Mr. Bob Ghassemieh entered into a cooperation agreement with the company pursuant to which the Issuer appointed Bob Ghassemieh to the Board. The company has also agreed to nominate Mr. Ghassemieh for election at the 2025 and 2026 AGM.

·         On February 20, 2026, the company accused director Bob Ghassemieh of breaching the Cooperation Agreement and accepted his escrowed resignation. He denied all allegations, called them baseless and retaliatory, but resigned citing inability to fulfill fiduciary duties. He also noted the agreement was signed before undisclosed sale plans and a large Ashford termination fee. On February 23, his counsel formally disputed the claims. Source

·         On March 13, 2026, the company sued Bob Ghassemieh and others alleging breach of a cooperation agreement and Section 13(d) disclosure violations, seeking damages and injunctive relief; the defendants deny the claims and plan to defend vigorously. Source

Blackwells Capital LLC & Al Shams Investments LTD

·         On March 22, 2024, Blackwells Capital LLC, along with its affiliates and Jason Aintabi, solicit support from stockholders for significant changes at the upcoming 2024 Annual Meeting. The changes proposed are aimed at aligning the corporation's governance policies and board composition more closely with all stockholders' best interests. This effort is encapsulated in the Proxy Statement and involves the election of four Blackwells nominees — Michael Cricenti, Jennifer M. Hill, Betsy L. McCoy, and Steven J. Pully — to the board for one-year terms. Additionally, Blackwells proposes several governance changes:

o   Removing the Bylaws' Overreaching Advance Notice Provision.

o   Preventing any current/former employee, director, officer, or control person of the Corporation or its affiliates from serving as chairman of the Board.

o   Disclosing all extraordinary transaction proposals received in the past two years and their terms.

o   Disclosing all compensation paid to the Bennett family, The Dallas Express, and its employees, directors, or agents.

Source

·         On March 29, 2024, Blackwells Capital filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees and proposals.

·         On April 9, 2024, Blackwells Capital issued a presentation regarding the management fees paid by the company to its advisor, Ashford Hospitality Advisors, LLC, a subsidiary of Ashford Inc.

·         On April 10, 2024, Blackwells Capital issued a press release and launched a website, www.NoMoreMonty.com, to communicate with the shareholders in connection with the Corporation’s 2024 AGM.

·         On April 11, 2024, Blackwells Capital filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the company and its directors. The complaint accused the corporation of rejecting Blackwells' nomination notice improperly, breaching its bylaws, and violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by issuing misleading statements and omitting necessary disclosures about The Dallas Express as a proxy participant. Source

·         On May 2, 2024, Blackwells Capital filed proxy materials seeking support for its nominees and proposals. Source

·         On May 9, 2024, Blackwells Capital issued a presentation entitled “Too Little, Too Late” regarding the company.

·         On May 20, 2024, Blackwells Capital released a presentation entitled “The Buffoonery of Monty Bennett” exposing Monty Bennett’s buffoonery

·         On June 3, 2024, Wafic Rida Saïd, Al Shams Investments LTD (9.8%), sent an email to Monty J. Bennett, the Chairman of the company, and Richard J. Stockton, the CEO and President of the company, setting forth certain recommendations relating to the management, including the termination of its management agreement with Ashford Inc., and replacement of some directors with independent directors. Source

·         On June 10, 2024, Blackwells Capital released a presentation criticizing Monty Bennett's leadership. Blackwells, supported by independent shareholders, aims to end Braemar's management agreement with Ashford Inc. and reconstitute the Board. Brancous LP1 and Braemar’s second-largest shareholder both voiced concerns about governance and called for changes. Blackwells urges shareholders to vote "FOR" their nominees and proposals on the WHITE proxy card and "AGAINST" Braemar’s executive compensation resolution. Source

·         On June 21, 2024, Blackwells Capital released a letter to shareholders criticizing Mr. Bennett and his associates for poor leadership, extracting nearly a billion dollars in fees, and misleading shareholders. Jason Aintabi, CIO of Blackwells, condemned Mr. Bennett’s actions and called for change, supported by major shareholders like Campbell Capital Management (CCM) and Brancous LP. CCM highlighted the lack of long-term growth under Mr. Bennett and endorsed Blackwells' efforts to restructure Braemar for the benefit of all shareholders.

·         On July 2, 2024, the company reached a cooperation agreement with Blackwells Capital LLC, wherein Blackwells will withdraw director nominations, cease proxy solicitation, support Braemar's directors and proposals at the 2024 Annual Meeting, and purchase 3.5 million shares of Braemar stock, partly financed by Braemar. Braemar will also add an additional independent director to its Board of Directors and will consider Blackwells’ input in this selection.

·         On July 4, 2024 Mr. Said, Al Shams Investments LTD sent an email to Mr. Stockton and Mr. Bennett expressing concerns about the terms of a Cooperation Agreement entered into on July 2, 2004 among the Company, Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc. and Ashford Inc., on the one hand, and Blackwells Parties, on the other hand  regarding the withdrawal of the Blackwells Parties’ proxy campaign, dismissal of pending litigation involving the parties and certain other matters.

·         On July 25, 2024 Mr. Said, Al Shams Investments LTD sent an email to Mr. Bennett and Mr. Stockton, expressing displeasure and frustration at the status of discussions with the company, reiterating key proposals in prior communications and requesting commitments from the company by the end of July 2024. Source

·         On November 7, 2024 Mr. Said, Al Shams Investments LTD sent a letter to the shareholders expressing concerns over significant corporate governance issues, including conflicts of interest and excessive management fees paid to Ashford Inc., controlled by Braemar’s board chair, Monty Bennett. Despite repeated requests for reforms—such as ending Braemar’s management agreement with Ashford, renegotiating termination fees, and appointing independent board members—Braemar has not taken action. Al Shams is now considering a proxy fight and has initiated an investigation into potential breaches of fiduciary duty by Braemar's leadership. Al Shams believes that removing these conflicts and bringing in fresh leadership could restore Braemar's long-term success.

·         On March 6, 2026, Wafic Rida Saïd (≈9.8% shareholder) sent a letter to Braemar Hotels & Resorts’ board raising concerns about governance, fiduciary oversight, and insider arrangements, citing shareholder complaints about fees received by Chairman Monty Bennett and potential termination payments exceeding $480 million. He warned that if directors fail to protect shareholder interests and address conflicts of interest, he may pursue legal action.

Stilwell reached an agreement with Lake Shore Bancorp, Inc (LSBK)

Key Summary:  On July 31, 2025, Stilwell (9.4%) expressed intent to work with management and the board to enhance shareholder value. On October 6, 2025, Stilwell (9.9%) stated that he intends to seek board representation. On February 18, 2026, Stilwell (9.9%) has nominated Timothy J. Andruschat for election to the Board at the 2026 annual meeting. On March 17, 2026, Stilwell reached a standstill agreement with the company and pursuant to it; Dennis Pollack has been appointed to the board

Market Cap: $113 million | Lake Shore Bancorp, Inc. operates as the savings and loan holding company for Lake Shore Savings Bank that provides banking products and services in New York.

·         On July 31, 2025, Stilwell (9.4%) stated that he hopes to work with management and the board to maximize shareholder value. Source

·         On October 6, 2025, Stilwell (9.9%) stated that he intends to seek board representation at the company’s 2026 annual meeting of shareholders. Source

·         On February 18, 2026, Stilwell (9.9%) has nominated Timothy J. Andruschat for election to the Board at the 2026 annual meeting and submitted a proposal restricting the company from acquiring any financial institution until its stock consistently trades above book value. Source

·         On March 17, 2026, Stilwell reached a standstill agreement with the company and pursuant to it; Dennis Pollack has been appointed to the board and will be nominated and supported by the company for election at the 2026 annual meeting. As part of the agreement, Stilwell withdrew its nomination of Timothy J. Andruschat and its shareholder proposal. Source

Summer Road Pushes Board Change at Ingles Markets (IMKTA) with Independent Nominee

Key Summary: Summer Road LLC is seeking to elect nominee Rory A. Held to Ingles Markets’ Board at the 2026 meeting, citing weak governance and limited independence due to family control, and urging shareholders to vote via the GOLD proxy card.

M. Cap: $1.6 billion| Ingles Markets, Incorporated (Ingles) is a supermarket chain in the southeast United States.

Summer Road LLC

Summer Road LLC, a shareholder of Ingles Markets, is seeking to elect its nominee Rory A. Held to the Board at the 2026 annual meeting, arguing that the company suffers from weak governance, limited independence, and poor shareholder engagement due to the Ingles family’s control; it believes adding an independent director with financial and capital markets expertise will improve oversight and enhance shareholder value, and is urging Class A shareholders to vote using its GOLD proxy card in support of its nominee.

GAMCO

GAMCO, initially holding a 16.89% stake, launched an activist campaign in 2017 to nominate directors and filed proxy materials for the 2018 AGM, but reached a settlement in March 2018 with the company agreeing to nominate one of its candidates, leading GAMCO to withdraw its slate; it later gradually reduced its stake to 13.97% in 2020 and 12.96% in 2021.

Chip Wilson to lululemon (LULU) CEO Candidates: Beware a Board Unfit to Support Visionary Leadership

Key Summary: Chip Wilson’s October 2025 letter argues lululemon has lost its innovative spirit and top talent under finance-led leadership, and urges a return to visionary, product-driven management and board diversity to revive the brand. On Dec 29, 2025, Chip Wilson nominated three independent directors—Marc Maurer (ex-On Holding Co-CEO), Laura Gentile (former ESPN CMO), and Eric Hirshberg (former Activision CEO)—for election to lululemon’s 2026 AGM and submitted a proposal to declassify the board.

Market Cap: $20 billion | lululemon athletica inc., together with its subsidiaries, designs, distributes, and retails technical athletic apparel, footwear, and accessories for women and men under the lululemon brand in the United States, Canada, Mexico, China Mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and internationally. 

·         On October 7, 2025, lululemon founder Chip Wilson (8.4%) issued a letter arguing that lululemon’s decline stems from replacing innovation-driven, founder-style leadership with finance-focused executives who prioritize immediate results over long-term brand strength, resulting in an exodus of top talent, misguided strategic decisions, and diminishing brand reputation; he calls for the company to refocus on creative leadership, product excellence, and a diverse, entrepreneurial board to restore its original edge and vision.

·         On Dec 29, 2025, Chip Wilson nominated three independent directors—Marc Maurer (ex-On Holding Co-CEO), Laura Gentile (former ESPN CMO), and Eric Hirshberg (former Activision CEO)—for election to lululemon’s 2026 AGM and submitted a proposal to declassify the board. Wilson said the board lacks creative leadership, and argued new directors are needed to restore brand momentum, oversee CEO succession, and drive long-term shareholder value. Source

·         On February 27, 2026, Chip Wilson publicly pushed for major board changes at lululemon, citing weak governance, lack of brand expertise, poor engagement, and a ~50% stock decline. He nominated three directors, proposed board declassification, criticized the board’s response and conflicts, and urged urgent reforms to restore shareholder value. Source

·         On March 5, 2026, Chip Wilson launched CreativityFirstlulu.com as part of his campaign to push strategic and governance changes at the company ahead of the 2026 annual meeting. The site promotes his three board nominees—Marc Maurer, Laura Gentile, and Eric Hirshberg—and argues the board needs stronger creative and brand-focused leadership. Source

·         On March 12, 2026, Chip Wilson warned potential CEO candidates that the company’s current board may be unable to support effective leadership, citing weak succession planning, limited refreshment, and concerns over independence due to ties with Advent International. He urged board changes ahead of the CEO selection and nominated Marc Maurer, Laura Gentile, and Eric Hirshberg as independent directors to add brand, product, and marketing expertise. Source

·         On March 17, 2026, Chip Wilson said lululemon’s board and leadership have failed to protect the brand, citing heavy discounting, weak product innovation, repeated execution mistakes, and prolonged weak North America sales, and urged shareholders to support his board nominees as a way to restore accountability and stronger brand and product leadership. Source

·         On March 18, 2026, Chip Wilson lululemon’s board changes were a positive but insufficient step, arguing that the board still suffers from major governance issues, weak oversight, and lacks the broader refresh needed before choosing a new CEO. He also criticized the company’s continued weak Americas comparable sales, unimpressive 2026 outlook, and the appointment of Chip Bergh, while reiterating that his own nominees are better positioned to drive the deeper board-level change lululemon needs. Source

Beretta Holding Nominated Four Directors to Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc.(RGR)

Key Summary: On February 24, 2026, Beretta Holding notified the company of its intent to nominate four director candidates for election at the 2026 annual meeting

Market Cap: $605 million | Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, designs, manufactures, and sells firearms under the Ruger name and trademark in the United States.

·         On February 24, 2026, Beretta Holding (9.95%) nominated four director candidates—William Detwiler, Mark DeYoung, Fredrick DiSanto, and Michael Christodolou—for election at the 2026 annual meeting. Beretta cited sustained shareholder value destruction driven by margin compression, poor capital allocation, weak governance, and misaligned incentives, highlighting minimal insider ownership, net insider selling, and severe underperformance versus peers and benchmarks. It argued the current board lacks relevant expertise and accountability, and that meaningful board change is necessary to restore oversight, improve performance, and maximize long-term shareholder value. Source

·         On March 5, 2026, Beretta Holding criticized the company’s weak Q4 and FY2025 results, citing declining margins, falling earnings, and ineffective strategy under current leadership. Beretta reiterated its push for board change at the 2026 annual meeting, promoting its four director nominees and arguing a governance reset is needed to restore profitability and accountability. Source

·         On March 10, 2026, Beretta Holding denied seeking control, stating it proposed only a strategic minority investment and limited board representation to improve performance. Beretta criticized Ruger’s board for resisting engagement, maintaining entrenched leadership despite underperformance, breaching confidentiality, and said it remains open to a negotiated solution. Source

·         On March 19, 2026, Beretta Holding sent a letter to stockholders stating that the company has suffered from years of underperformance, weak execution, and poor board oversight, and urged shareholders to elect its four nominees to improve accountability and restore shareholder value. It urged investors to elect its four independent nominees to improve oversight and restore value.

Timothy O'Connell pushes for strategic review and potential board change at Airgain, Inc. (AIRG)

Key Summary: On March 19, 2026, Timothy O'Connell said the stock is undervalued, argued the company could be worth more in a sale, and indicated he may push for a strategic review, engage with shareholders, and seek board changes to unlock value.

Market Cap: $48 million | Airgain, Inc. provides wireless connectivity solutions that offer embedded components, external antennas, and integrated systems in North America, China, and internationally. 

On March 19, 2026, Timothy O'Connell said the stock is materially undervalued, criticized the board for failing to create shareholder value since the IPO, and argued the company may be worth more in a sale than as a public company. They estimate shareholders could receive about $11 to $13 per share in a strategic transaction and said they may push for a strategic review, engage with other shareholders, and seek board changes to pursue a sale or another value-maximizing outcome. Source

Trian and General Catalyst reaffirm $49 per share Janus Henderson (JHG) acquisition after rival bid rejection

Key Summary: Trian Fund Management disclosed a 9.9% activist stake in Janus Henderson in October 2020 and engaged with the board on strategic and operational initiatives, later increasing its stake to 15.43% in 2021 while proposing board changes. In February 2022, Trian’s Nelson Peltz and Ed Garden joined the board, with Brian Baldwin replacing Peltz in November 2022. On March 11, 2026, Trian and General Catalyst reaffirmed their $49 per share all-cash acquisition of Janus Henderson, expected to close in mid-2026 after the board rejected a rival proposal.

Market Cap: $7.8 billion | Janus Henderson Group plc is an asset management holding entity. Through its subsidiaries, the firm provides services to institutional, retail clients, and high net worth clients. It manages separate client-focused equity and fixed income portfolios.

·         In October 2020, Trian Fund Management disclosed a 9.9% activist stake and stated that it intends to further discuss with the board and/or management and may encourage the company to explore certain strategic combinations. Source

·         On October 4, 2021, Trian Fund Management (14.43%) stated that it has met with the company's Non-Executive Chairman Richard Gillingwater and CEO Richard M. Weill to discuss, and they intend to continue to discuss with members of the board and/or management from time to time, various strategic and operational initiatives that Trian Fund believes can generate value, including recommendations relating to the company’s operations, organizational structure, technology, product offerings, talent development and retention strategies, capital allocation and dividend policies and corporate governance Source

·          On November 16, 2021, Trian Fund Management (15.43%) stated that it continues to engage in discussions with the board and/or management regarding various strategic and operational initiatives that they believe can generate value. As part of those discussions, Trian Fund Management has proposed changes to the composition of the board, including the addition of independent directors unaffiliated with them. Source

·         On February 1, 2022, the company increased the size of its Board and appointed each of Nelson Peltz, CEO and a Founding Partner of Trian Management, and Ed Garden, CIO and a Founding Partner of Trian Management, as Independent Non-Executive Directors effective as of such date. The company has agreed to include Mr. Peltz and Mr. Garden on its slate of director nominees in its proxy statement for its 2022 AGM. The Board has appointed Mr. Peltz to the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, and it has appointed Mr. Garden to the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and the Compensation Committee. Source

·         On November 15, 2022, the company appointed Brian Baldwin, a Partner and Senior Analyst at Trian Management, in place of Nelson Peltz, who resigned as a Non-Executive Director of the company. Source

·         On March 11, 2026, Trian Fund Management and General Catalyst reaffirmed their commitment to complete the previously announced all-cash acquisition of Janus Henderson Group for $49 per share, expected to close in mid-2026. The Janus Henderson board unanimously reaffirmed its support for the transaction and rejected an unsolicited third-party proposal, concluding it was not superior and carried significant execution and closing risks. Source

·         On March 20, 2026, Trian Fund Management released an investor presentation opposing Victory Capital’s unsolicited proposal to acquire Janus Henderson, citing significant execution and closing risks, alleged misrepresentation of key facts, and concerns over Victory’s weakening fundamentals, concluding there is no realistic path for the deal to close and that it could destroy shareholder value. Trian reaffirmed support for its own $49 per share all-cash offer alongside General Catalyst, emphasizing superior value, greater certainty, and a clear path to closing by mid-2026.

Steamboat Capital Partners entered into a cooperation agreement with Medifast (MED)

Key Summary:  Steamboat Capital Partners – March 19, 2026: Sent a letter highlighting undervaluation (below net cash) and proposing a cost-driven turnaround; simultaneously secured 2 board seats via a cooperation agreement. Engaged Capital – Disclosed 5.7% stake in 2014 calling the company an undervalued acquisition target; in 2015 gained board influence (5 seats, declassification) via cooperation, with stake later fluctuating ~4.5%–5.8% through 2020.

M.Cap: $109 million | Medifast, Inc. is engaged in the production, distribution, and sale of weight loss and weight management products and other consumable health and diet products.

Steamboat Capital Partners

·         On March 19, 2026, Steamboat Capital Partners (6%) sent a letter to the board arguing the company is significantly undervalued—trading below its net cash—and outlining a credible turnaround path driven by cost-cutting, operational right-sizing, and improved efficiency across corporate and technology functions. While acknowledging industry challenges, including GLP-1 impacts, Steamboat believes Medifast can restore profitability and achieve peer-level margins, with substantial upside potential, and expressed willingness to work with the board to execute the turnaround.

·         On March 19, 2026, Steamboat Capital Partners entered into a cooperation agreement with the company, securing the nomination of two of their suggested candidates to the board, reflecting an active role in governance.

Engaged Capital

 In May 2014, Engaged Capital disclosed a 5.7% stake, highlighting the company as an attractive acquisition target undervalued by the market. On April 3, 2015, it entered into a cooperation agreement securing board representation and declassification of the board, followed by gaining five board seats at the June 17, 2015 AGM. Subsequently, Engaged reduced its stake to 4.5% in November 2017, increased it to 5.8% on July 10, 2020, and slightly reduced it again to 4.9% on July 15, 2020.

Goldenwise Capital highlights undervaluation and signals engagement with potential board representation at Phunware, Inc. (PHUN)

Key Summary: On March 20, 2026, Goldenwise Capital Group Ltd (5.5%) stated the company is undervalued and plans to engage with management and the board on strategy, capital allocation, governance, and operations, while indicating potential pursuit of board representation.

M.Cap: $36 million | Phunware, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides integrated software platform that equips companies with the products, solutions, and services to engage, manage, and monetize their mobile application portfolios in the United States and internationally.

On March 20, 2026, Goldenwise Capital Group Ltd (5.5%) stated that the company is undervalued relative to its intrinsic value, including balance sheet strength and strategic opportunities, and intends to engage with management and the board on capital allocation, strategy, governance, and operational improvements to enhance shareholder value. They stated that they may seek board representation to support this engagement. Source